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rN THE SUPREME COURT
0'F THE STATE OF UTAH
TIME COMMERCrAL FINANCING CORr.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff~Respondent,

vs.
CAROL BRIMHALL, WILLIAM HESTERMAN,
STEPHEN D. SCI:IDLTZ and BRU1HALL .
PRODUCTS, INC., a corporation, and
4-SPECTRA, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
Administrator with the Will annexed
of the Estate of Ray s. Brimhall,
deceased,

Case No. 16167

Defendant~Appellant

and Third-Party
Plaintiff,

vs.
BRIMCO HYDRAULICS &ENGINEERrNG,
INC., a corporation, JOHN B.
FAIRBANKS, JR., and WESTERN RESEARCH
AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
Third Party
Defendants.
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NATURE Of THE CASE
This action is a post judgment contract dispute in
which Walker Bank and others seek to recover the money (_royalties}
awarded oy the Trial Court as compensation for the exclusive
patent License awarded to TIMEC0 1 and in which Walker Bank
seeks enforcement of a Trial Court judgment and the decision
of this Supreme Court in a prior appeal in this action,

DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT
On October 24, 1978 1 the Trial Court entered an
Order granting a Hotion for Summary Judgment by which the
question of whether or not Walker Bank was to receive its money
(royalties} was dismissed as a federal question without holding
the evidentiary hearing earlier mandated by this Court.
Simultaneously, the Trial Court refused to enforce its own
Decree of July 30, 1975 through which it imposed a contract
on the parties requiring payment of money (yoyalties) by the
plaintiff TIMECO to Walker Bank and Carol Brimhall Davis, the
defendants and appellants herein,

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants-appellants seek reversal of the Trial
Court's decision dismissing the question of whether or not
royalties are due and a mandate directing the Trial Court to
act to enforce its own Decree of July 30, 1975, to promptly
conduct the evidentiary hearing heretofore mandated by this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Court on the issue of whether or not TIJviECO is obligated to
Walker Bank and Carol Brimhall Davis for past unpaid royalties
and on the issue of contempt, hut not including the issue of
patent validity.

PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
The appellants herein are defendants below, Walker
Bank

&Trust

Company, Administrator with the Will annexed of

the Estate of Ray S, Brimhall, deceased (_hereinafter referred
to as "Walker Bank") and Carol Brimhall Davis (hereinafter
referred to as "Davis").
The respondent and cross-appellant is TIME COMMERCIAL
FINANCING, CORP, which is hereinafter referred to as "TTHECO",
The cross-respondents are Walker Bank, Davis and
Brimhall Products, Inc.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case has a lengthy history dating back before
1~71,

The factual background is thus broken down into appro-

priate time frames and other subjects.
Pre-Liti!iatioh (_1"965 to 1971)
In 1965 and 1967, RayS, Brimhall invented first
a hydraulic valve and system and then a mechanical latch for
use on trucks described in more detail hereafter CR-601),
The products were made and sold eventually by Brimco Hydraulics
and Engineering, Inc,, a corporation (BRH1CO} 01-med by Ray
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Brimh_all and his partner
of lg6g.

(R~599l,

Ray Brimhall died in November

CR~602l,

After Ray Brimhall's death, BRJMCO obtained financing
from TIJ:!ECO CR-6131 and eventually defaulted on its obligations
to pay back the loan CR-6151,

TINECO thereafter foreclosed

on security positions and purchased the "collateral" at a public
sale in March, 1971 (_R-618),
The fnitial Dispute (1971)
At the time of the sale in March, 19 71, Walker Bank,
as administrator, (R-601} claimed ownership of Ray Brimhall's
inventions which then were in the form of an issued U,S, Patent
and a pending

u.s.

Patent Application (R-619},

TrMECO took

issue with Walker Bank and commenced this action claiming total
ownership of the patent and patent applicaion (R-3}.

Later,

TINECO added a claim against Walker Bank, Ray Brimhall's widow
(now Carol Brimhall Davis), Brimhall Products, Inc, and others
for damages on the theory that the ownership rights of TIMECO
had been derogated or subverted,

That claim was principally

based on the granting of a patent license by Walker Bank to
Brimhall Products, Inc,, which was a company set up by Carol
Brimhall (Ray Brimhall's widowl and others to make and sell
products under the patents (_R-9gl,
The Tri:al And Its
Outcome 0·9n-19'7Sl
The issue of ownership of the patent and patent
application 1vas tried to the Court without a jury in January,
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1972, witQ remaining issues reserved by severance for later
disposition.

After tQe trial and exhaustive post trial liti-

gation, tQe Trial Court eventually entered Amended Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree (R-599-6261 on July
30, 1975.
As per the Amended Decree, tQe Trial Court found
th.at TU1ECO -did: not own the patent and patent application for
Ray Brimhall's inventions

(R-6021~

It found rather that owner-

ship 1v-as in l'falker Bank (as administrator of Ray Brimhall's
Estate) subject to implied contract rights in the form of an
implied exclusive license which TU1ECO had acquired at the
foreclosure sale (R-602-6191.

The Trial Court found that the

license carried th.e ooligation to pay royalties, and that TH!ECI
was so obligated (R-609-R-619}.

The Findings and Conclusions

were properly implemented in the Decree (R-624).
Post Judgment (19"76-19 78}
In December, 1976, Walker Bank and Carol Brimhall,
now Carol Brimhall Davis, instituted post judgment proceedings
to obtain judgment for royalties due under the Decree which
THIECO refuses to pay.

Th.e proceedings 1v-ere commenced by an

Order to Shmi Cause (R-710.}.

It is the disposition of that

Order to Show Cause dated December 8, 1976, which provides the
legal and factual premise of this appeal.
1. Initial Resolution of
Order To Show Cause (19 ;6}

On December 22, 1976, the Trial Court had a hearing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to resolve the Order to Show Cause
motion to vacate it (R-7141.

CR~7261

and TIMECO's counter

By minute entry or Memorandum

Decision dated January 24, 1977, the Trial Court found that
lvalker Bank and Davis were entitled to the unpaid royal ties
and ordered that further proceedings be had to set the amount
due (R-7S41.

This order was much later

formalized·~~

tunc (R-868}.
2.

The First Appeal (1977}
TrMECO took exception to the Trial Court's Ruling

of January 24, 1977 and eventually appealed to this Court
claiming it was denied due process of law because it was
precluded from presenting the Trial Court with additional
evidence (R-8101.
This Court ruled that the record below did not have
sufficient evidence to support the ruling of January 24, 1977.
This Court then remanded for further proceedings (Appeal No.
15136, Opinion filed February 10, 1978),
3.

Simultaneous With Appeal (19 7 7)
Through the summer of 1977, simultaneous with the

appeal process, TrMECO initiated and pursued proceedings in
the Trial Court to obtain resolution of then still unresolved
causes which had been severed and reserved since 1972 (R-8791.
Walker Bank and Davis responded with a Motion foT Summary
Judgment on the severed causes (R-932}.

Nothing was resolved

because a stay of all Trial Court proceedings was obtained
by
TIMECO on October 4, 19 77 (R-1114}.
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..

Post Appeal (1978)
After remittitur in April 1978 (_R-11251, THIECO filed
its second !lotion for Summary Judgment of Patent Invalidity
on April 28,

1~78(~-1130)"

Its first Motion had been presented

and denied (R-564-581) before entry of the final Amended Decree
of July 30, 1g75o

TINECO's second motion and Walker Bank's

unresolved 1977 Motion for Summary Judgment on the untried
causes were heard by the Trial Court on June 26, 19780
The Trial Court granted Walker Bank's

~lotion

for

Summary Judgment by dismissing THIECO' s earlier severed and
still untried causes on the grounds set forth by Walker Bank
that the causes sound in patent infringement and are thus a
federal question (R-12 71) o

Further, THIECO 1 s

~lotion

for Summary

Judgment of Patent Invalidity was denied,
Thereafter, THIECO filed a

~lotion

for Summary Judgment

to dismiss Walker Bank's claim for unpaid royal ties w·hlch \'las
raised by the December 8, 19;6 Order to Show Cause (R-1282),
In the alternative, TDlECO sought an order to force l<falker
Bank into ne,,-ly authori;:ed Patent Office proceedings to revie"
the issue of validity (R-1285}.
The Trial Court refused to order Patent Office proceedings but did grant TDIECO' s :lotion for Summary Judgment
to dismiss, and in fact dismissed the question of 1;hether
ro;·alties under the July 3Cl,

19~5

i)ecree are to be paid on

the grounds that it is a federal question

CR-134~}.

1'\alker 3ank thereafter took this appeal hen that
order and separate!;- sought :iandarms as KelL

The

~lanciar1us
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proceedings 1.-ere dismissed in favor of this Appeal,

rn the

interim, TriECO filed a cross appeal claiming error in other
parts of the Trial Court's ruling if the Trial Court is reversed,
Th:e ·products
The products involved in the dispute are for use
on the large semi-truck tractors of the type which have the
cab mounted over the engine so that the cab must be tipped
forward to provide access to the engine for maintenance,

The

hydraulic system and valve are used to port oil to a hydraulic
tilting piston or cylinder from a manually operated hand pump,
The valve also ports hydraulic fluid to a cab latch.
The cab latch operates to latch the cab of :he semitruck tractor down in normal use,

It is

construc:e~

:: 'lave

a spring to improve the "ride" experienced by the driver,
The hydraulic system overcomes the spring and unlatches it
so that the cab can be tilted.
Frequent reference is had to a "Silver Latch" and
a "Black Latch",

These terms relate to the actual color of

constructed cab latches,

The "Silver Latch" (Exhibit D-2)

is one for which TH!ECO admits royalties are due, and has in
fact been paying royal ties thereon,

The "Black Latch" (.E:xhlbi t

D-ll is claimed by TH!ECO to be an improvement latch and suf-

ficiently different to not be under license,

TU!ECO is not

paying royalties on the "Black Latch",
Frequent reference is also had to the "Brimhall Latch"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and to a "Nordell-Kimhall Latch'',

The Brimhall Latch is the

same as the Silver Latch; and the Black Latch is the same as
the Nordell-Kimhall Latch,
The Patents
There are three patents which have been frequently
referred to during the course of these proceedings:
Cal

U.S. Patent No, 3,430,653, issued March

4, 1969, was invented by Ray S, Brimhall and is
directed to the hydraulic valve and system used for
tipping the cabs,
COl

U,S, Patent No, 3,797,882, issued March

19, 1974, to Walker Bank (as Administrator} was
invented by Ray

s.

Brimhall and is directed to the

latch used to hold the cab of the semi-truck tractor
in place.

This patent was pending before the Patent

Office at the outset of this matter, but has obviously
now issued as a patent,
(cl

U,S. Patent No, 3,752,519, issued August

14, 1973, to R, Nordell and H, C, Kimball,
is not admitted into evidence,

The patent

It is sometimes

referred to hy TIMECO as the Nordell-Kimball patent,
Su..Tfliifart of the
factua D:Lspute
Into UL7S, THIECO resisted paying any royalties.
TIMECO had even obtained a Temporary Restraining Order from
Judge Ritter to avoid payment,

Hm-rever, eventually TINECO
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was compelled to and did pay royalties on the Silver Latch.
About that time, it started to make a slightly different latch
known as the Black

Late~

TIMECO has continued to pay royalties

on the Silver Latch and has refused and continues to refuse
to pay royalties on the Black Latch.

Walker Bank 1 as Admin-

istrator, and Carol Brimhall Davis, the widow and heir, started
post judgment proceedings to collect royalties on the Black
Latch.

The amount of accrued royalties due with interest is

estimated to nolv substantially exceed $50,000.00.
TD1ECO has refused to pay basically because it claims
the Brimhall Latch patent is invalid and because it claims
that the Black Latch does not infringe the claims of the Brimhall
Latch patent.
Walker Bank and Davis, however, assert that validity
can no longer be raised in this case and that even if it could
the patent is valid.

~'{alker

Bank and Davis further assert that

the Black Latch is a royalty-bearing latch which does infringe
the Brimhall Latch patent.

The question of infringement centers

on the way the latch hook moves as it travels between latched
and unlatched positions.
Summ:arb of The
te·gallspute
The legal dispute which is the predicate of this
appeal relates to two separate aspects of this case.
The first deals with the claim of Walker Bank and
TINECO for past unpaid royalties.

TU1ECO urged the Trial Court
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to dismiss
aut~ority

t~e

claim as a federal question in the face of clear

that the State Court can entertain issues of infringe-

ment in resolving State Court claims of the type here involved"
Tli..e Trial Court adopted TIHEC0 1 s view and dismissed the question,
Walker Bank and Davis appeal now to reverse that decision.
T~e

second aspect relates to TIMEC01s earlier severed

and untried causes.

T~e

gist of those causes is that the defen-

dants derogated patent rights owned by TIMECO.

The Trial Court

dismissed the causes, inter alia, because they sound like and
are a patent infringement cause exclusively under Federal
jurisdiction.

ARGUMENT
T~e

Trial Court erred in dismissing the question

of whether royalties are due on the Black Latch as a federal
question.

The Trial Court erred because the question on its

face is clearly a State Court issue properly in a State Court
under compelling authority.
it

T~e

Trial Court erred because

a duty to enforce its own judgment, which is the predi-

~as

cate for the question and the basis upon which it is founded"
The Trial Court erred because it refused or failed to follow
the mandate of this Court in an earlier first appeal in this
action.

TBE TRIAL COURT HAS A DUTY TO ENFORCE
ITS OWN JUDGMENT AND Sl:lOULD BE COHPELLED TO SO ACT
It has long been the law of the State of Utah that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tQe enforcement of a judgment is a duty of the District Court.
Ketchem Coal Co.· v. Cllris·tehsen et al, 48 UtaQ 214, 159. Pac.
541 (l!H6l.
In Ketchem Coal, ·supra, tQe plaintiff coal company,
by condemnation proceeding, obtained an order or judgment giving
it possession and occupancy of a strip of ground for purposes
of building a tramway to transport coal to a nearoy rail line.
The defendants thereafter interferred with the construction
of the tramway.

The plaintiff thus asked the District Court

for, and the District Court did issue, an order to show cause
why the defendants tQerein SQOuld not be made to comply with
the judgment and why tQe defendants SQould not be Qeld in
contempt.

The defendants demurred to the order; and the Trial

Court sustained the demurrer.

159 Pac. at 542.

In mandamus proceedings filed in this Court, the
plaintiff coal company sought a writ compelling the District
Court to enforce its judgment.

In ordering that the writ issue,

this Court stated:

The Ju-dgment fn Tnis Case
The Law
judgment
orfor order
Qere byat
issue
is and
theLibrary
Amended
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding
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of Museum
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Decree of July 3U, lg7s, by the Honorable James S, Sawaya in
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,

copy

A

of that judgment is affixed to this Brief as Exhibit I.

The

pertinent part of that judgment is paragraph 3 which provides
that:
11 3,
, , , (TINECO) is the owner of an implied
exclusive license under,,.(the Brimhall Patents),.,
In return for said license, ,,.(TINECO) ••• is obligated to pay l'falker Bank ••• royal ties in the arcount
of two percent (2%} of total sales of Valve Systems
and Cab Latch.es and parts thereof. ,.,",

Reque·sr To Enforce Judgment
By ex parte motion dated December 6, 1976, supported
by affidavits, Davis and Walker Bank asked the Court to and
the Court did issue its Order To Sh.ow Cause, dated December
9, 1976, directing TH1ECO to appear and show cause why judgment
sh.ould not be entered in favor of Walker Bank against TH!ECO
for past unpaid royalties,
The petitioners herein have thus requested enforcement
of the judgment in the same manner and on the same basis as
the plaintiff in Ketchum Coal, supra,

Indeed, Walker Bank

and Davis have repeatedly and strenuously requested enforcement
since December 1976,
Refusa:l T'o Enfor-ce Jud!'m:ent_
On October 24, 1978, upon motion by TillE CO, the Trial

Court, ny Judge Sawaya, dismissed the question of whether
royalties are due on the "Black Latch" on the grounds that
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the question is to be resolved in the Federal courts,

The

Trial Court has thus refused to enforce its o\m judgment.
The Trial Court has refused erroneously to act in accordance
with its clear duty.

The Trial Court has no discretion,

The Trial Court must act on the merits of the request to enforce
the Judgment of July 30, 1975,
Tt Is Pro·per To Compel The
Ir~al Court To Act
This Court iri Ketchum Coal Co, v; Chr-istensen,
supra, found that it was proper to compel a district court
judge to proceed,.to act,.,to enforce his o1m judgment.

The

situation here presented is virtually on all fours with Ketchum
Coal,

This Court may and should compel the District Court

to act to determine if the facts support enforcement and to
thereafter enforce or not enforce the Judgment,
Federal Question
Is Not Involved

A

The basis for the Trial Court's decision is that
the question of whether or not royalties are due is a federal
question.

It appears that the Trial Court concluded that it

may or should examine whether or not the accused royalty-bearing
Black Latch fits within the claims of the Brimhall Latch Patent,
It further appears that the Trial Court concluded such an
inquiry is federal,
The conclusion is erroneous.

It cannot· ipso

~

be a federal question to determine the scope of a state court
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judgment and liability for damages and contempt thereunder,
Further, it is clear under well established authority that
the inquiry which the Trial Court thought to be exclusively
federal is not exclusively federal and is a proper subject
for the Trial Court,

fnfra,, at page 16,

THE TRIAL COURT HAS A DUTY
TO FOLLOW THE PRIOR APPEAL DECISION
OF THIS COURT AND HAY BE COMPELLED TO SO ACT
It is the law of the State o£ Utah that a Trial Court
must follow the decision of this Supreme Court upon remand
or remittitur after appeaL

Street v, Fo·urth Jud-icial District

Court, ·--Utah _ _ , 191 P, Zd 153 (1948}; Utah Copper Co,
v, Distr·ic·t Court of Third Judi-cial District, 91 Utah 377,
64 P,Zd 241 (1937),

As stated by this Court in Utah Copper

"The rule is well established and there does
not seem to be anything tv the contrary that when
a case has been determined by a reviewing court and
remanded to the trial court, 'the ·duty of the latter
is to com~ly with the mandate of the former," 64
P,Zd at 2 a (emphasis added},
This language was cited with approval in Street v, Fourth
Judicial District Court, supra, 191 P,Zd at 157,
The Prior Decision
Of This Court
TIMECO took appeal in April 1977,

The Decision and

Opinion of this Court was filed in Appeal No. 15136 on February
10, 1978.

In that Decision and Opinion, this Court noted the

nature of the proceedings and held that:
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"The record before us is totally devoid of
evidence and does not and cannot support the findings
below.
"The judgment of January 24 1 1~77 is reversed
and remanded for further proceed~ngs
in accord with
this opinion." Decision and Opinion filed February
lG, 1978, at page 3,
The Decision and Opinion is unambiguous and clear.
It directs further proceedings in accordance with the decision.
Those proceedings are clearly to be evidentiary proceedings
to resolve the issue of liability for royalties on the "Black
Latch".

No other issue was extant in that appeal.

TIMECO,

in its Appeal Brief (undated}, stated quite clearly that the
relief sought in that appeal was:
" ••• reversal of an order to pay royalties •••
and.,.remand to the lower court to consider additional evidence." Appellant's Appeal Brief, Appeal
No. 15136, at page 2.
This Court granted that relief and remanded with
a specific direction to proceed.
The Law- o·f This
Case Is Settled
The appeal taken by THIECO and the decision rendered
by this Court has established the law of this case.

As stated

by this Court in Utah Copper Co. v. 1Jistrict Cour·t of the
Thlr·a Judicia:11Jistrict, supra:
"Whateve:r comes hefore and is decided and disposed of by the reviewing court is considered as
finally settled and the inferior court is bounaoy
tKe decree as the law of the ·case and must carry
it into execution accord~ng to tKe mandate,..".
64 P. 2 d at 2 SO.
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'-'Th.e mandate :ls binding on the lower court and
must ne strictly ~allowed and carried into effect
according to its true intent and meaning," 64 Po2d
at 25U,
Under th.e law of th.e case doctrine in this matter,
the only action left to be taken was the setting of an evidentiary hearing, th.e taking of TIMEC0 1 s additional evidence
and the rendering of a decision.
permit no other actiono

The law of this case could

All issues pertaining to the post-

judgment enforcement proceedings were available to be raised
by TIMECO on December 22, 1976, and were available to be raised
on the appeal then taken.

They were not.

The sole issue argued

on appeal was TUIECO's right to put on additional evidenceo
That right was granted and is the settled law of this caseo
The Tr-ial Court Has Refused
To Follow The Dec1s1on And
Op1h1on b£ 'this Court
On October 24, 1978, the Trial Court, by the Honorable
James So Sawaya, entered an order dismissing the question of
whether royalties were due on the "Black Latch" without an
evidentiary hearing and on erroneous grounds by which jurisdiction over the question was disclaimed.

The Trial Court

thus failed and refused to follow the Decision and Opinion
of this Court rendered in Appeal Noo 15136o

THE DISMISSAL Of THE QUESTION
OF TIMECO'S LIABILITY FOR ROYALTIES AS
A FEDERAL QUESTION IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
By the Amended Decree of July 3G, 1975, the Trial
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Court, by the Honorable James S. Sawaya, found an implied
contract to exist hy awarding TIMECO an implied

e~clusive

patent

license subject to the condition of paying royalties to Walker
Bank on total sales of Valve Systems and Cab Latches and parts
thereof.

It cannot be disputed that an

e~clusive

license,

or any license, is in effect and in fact, ·a· c·ontra·ct.

D"sc·ar

Barnett Foun·dry Co, v. Crowe, 219 Fed.Rptr. 450, 455 (CCA,
3rd CKT, 1915),

The owner of the patent by contract typically

licenses or authorizes another to make, use and sell an invention
in exchange for royalties to be paid by the licensee.

Id,

In this case, the Trial Court imposed the contract
on unwilling parties by implication,

The Trial Court cannot

now deny jurisdiction to determine the scope of the royalty
right it awarded to Walker Bank and the scope of the royalty
obligation it imposed on TIMECO.
in the form of a judgment,

The contract is extant and

The United States District Court

for the District of Utah cannot enforce that judgment or the
contract therein contained because there is no jurisdictional
basis for it to do so.
diversity jurisdiction,

First, and most obvious, there is no
Second, Walker Bank is not suing TIMECO

for patent infringement so that jurisdiction would be exclusively
federal under 28 USC 1338,

Rather, Walker Bank is proceeding

to obtain the contractual benefit and the judgment rights it
was awarded by the Trial Court under State law.
A Utah State District Court, and in particular the
Trial Court herein, has jurisdiction over contract disputes.
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-3-4 (1953, Vol. 9A},

Even though
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J

Federal Court jurisdiction is exclusive in patent matters under
28 USC 13.38, ·it n:a·s oeen: re:pe·ated1.y h:ela: tha:t' ·a stat·e· caurt
n:as· jurisdiction· O"(er ·contractual disputes reTatin:g· to patents 1
· ·an:d ·tna:t' a· ·st·a:te co·u:rt may en:ter't'ain is sues· YeTa ting ·t·o' pat en ts
· in:d1idihg patent· ·i·n:frihgenient and/or paten:t· Validity if n:ec·essary ·to· ·decide tii.e ·case.
IIi Luckett v. Delpart,· rn·c. e·t· al, 270
(1~261,

u.s.

495

Chief Justice Taft, without dissent, held that:
"• •• where a patentee complaintant makes his
suit one for recovery of royalties under a contract
of license.,,he does not give the federal district
court jurisdiction of the cause as one arising under
the patent laws." 270 u.s. at 510,

c. f.;

Kysor· Industrial Corporation v. ve·t, Inc.,

459 F,2d 1010, 173 USPQ 642 (CCA, 6th CKT, 19721, remanding
a transferred case to the state court because it sounded in
contract; 'Lea:r Sie·grer Inc, v. Adkins, 330 F.2d 595, 141 USPQ
327 (CCA, 9th CKT, 1964}, deferring to a state court action
under a patent license; Lea·r v; Adkins, 395 US 653, 162 USPQ
1 (1969), is a companion action to Lear Siegler in which remand
was had to a state court to resolve patent issues.

In the

recent decision of MilpYint Inc.· v; Curwo·od, _ _ F. Zd

--·

1g6 USPQ 147 (CCA, 7th CKT, 1977} (copy affixed as Exhibit

IIl, a dismissal of a declaratory judgment action for patent

invalidity and non-infringement was upheld in view of a prior
pending state court action to recover royalties under a patent
license.
TD1ECO itself cannot :fairly deny the accuracy of
this fundamental precept of law.

In a much earlier filed Trial
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Court document in this case

(R-469~4

721, TUIECO asserted that:

"If questions of patent infringement and validity
are ancillary to actions arising under contracts
involving patents, the overwhelming weight of authority
supports jurisdiction of such questions By a state
court handling the transaction." (R-470}
TH1ECO goes on to cite numerous authorities to support this
proposition.
In the prior appeal of TIME CO in this Court, TINE CO

argued at length that the Trial Court had earlier erred because
TINECO had not been allowed to put on evidence relating to
patent infringement.
at pages 8 through 16.

Appellant's Brief in Appeal No. 15136,
TH1ECO premised this argument on the

proposition that "a state court may entertain and decide issues
of patent ••• infringement 1-rhen these are ancillary to contract
or some other issue under state law."
Appeal No. 15136, at page 15.

Appellant's Brief in

The defendants Walker Bank and

Davis agree.
Since it is clear that a state court can resolve
issues relating to patents of the type in this case, and since
it is clear that the issue below related to the Trial Court's
own judgment, it >vas clearly erroneous ifor the Trial Court
to dismiss the question of whether royalties are due on the
"Black Latch" as a matter for determination in the Federal
Court,
If There Are Patent Issues,
TRey Are AncJ.llary
The real issue in the Trial Court is whether or not
the "Black Latch" made and sold by TU1ECO (admitted} is a latch
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for which royalties are to be paid under the language of the
Amended Decree of July 3U, lg?s, which requires payment of
royalties on "total sales,,,o£ Cab latches and parts thereof".
It would be totally consistent for the Trial Court to receive
evidence on that issue without ever confronting any patent
questions.
However, if patent questions such as patent infringement were found to be involved, such questions would be totally
ancillary to the above-stated issue,

That is, the Trial Court

would resolve the issue as a prerequisite to resolving the
State Court issue on the scope of its own judgment and the
contractual rights and obligations it imposed on the parties,
The Law o·f the· Case
Res Judic·a:ta: LJ.niJ.t
· Ahy Pate·nr rs·sues

On May 27, 197$ 1 TIMECO presented a Motion For Summary
Judgment Of Patent Invalidity (R-564),

The motion was denied

by Judge Sawaya in his Order of June 12, 1975 (R-580-581},
This occurred prior to the entry of the final Judgment on July
30 1 1975,

TIMECO did not appeal from the final Judgment, which,

of course, required TIMECO, inter alia, to pay royalties on
the total sales of cab latches,
Nonetheless, TU1ECO has continued to vigorously assert
a right to re.litigate the issue of patent validity before the
Trial Court,

The law o£ the case is settled,

The matter was

raised before final Judgment and not appealed,
TU1ECO, of course, vehemently disagrees,

TIMECO
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ha~,

at least in the past, presented lengthy and complex argu-

ments that it is entitled to raise the two main patent issues
of patent infringement, and particularly the issue of patent
validity.

The premise of TIMECO's argument that it is entitled

to attack the validity of the patent is the widely known doctrine
that a patent licensee may attack the patent under which the
license is granted on grounds of patent validity.

This doctrine

finds its genesis in the landmark case of Le·ar v. Adkins,

The defendants do not quarrel with the vitality of
the doctrine; but it IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE FACTUAL CONTEXT
OF THIS CASE.

First, TIMECO earlier raised the validity issue

and obtained an adverse ruling (R-5811.

The Lear v, Adki-ns

doctrine is not one which permits a party to relitigate the
same issue in the same case.

Res· .Judicata does attach to

validity decisions/adjudications,

USM Corp. v. Stand-ard

Pressed Steel Co., 453 F, Supp. 743, 200 USPQ 788 (D.C. N.D.Ill,
1978).
In USl<l Cory. v. Standard Presse-d Steel Co., supra,
200. USPQ at 793, USM at licensee sought to challenge the validity of the patent of licensor.

USM had earlier obtained

its patent license in a court decree.

The Court noted that:

"Such_ a decree is a judicial act :rather than
as a cont-.act, Unixe·d -states v, -s,vift- & ·co,, 286
US 10.6 115, and ~s ~enera:lly accorded fun res
iudicah effect, On~ted States v. Southern Ute
nd1ans 4t12 U.S. 1S9., 91 s.Ct, !136, 28 L.Ed, 2d
695 09hl; 1'fa:Uace Clark & Co., Inc. y, Acheson
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Industries, Inc., 532 F. 2d 846 1 190 USJ?Q 321 (_2nd

CKT, 19761; lB Moore's Federal Practice, Section
0..4Cl.9j5J "• (emphasis added} zoa USJ?Q at 7SL3.
The Court then held that

~

judicata precluded USH

from again raising the issue of patent validity,
the case and the doctrine of
litigation on that issue.

~judicata

The law of

preclude further

If this were not followed, a party

could interminably relitigate decided and final issues.

TIHECO

has so acted in this case re-raising the issue of patent validity
directly (R-ll3Ul and indirectly (_R-1285},

However, the Trial

Court has consistently denied all efforts by TIHECO to resurrect
the issue (R-134 7}.
Thus, if there are patent issues ancillary to these
proceedings, the issues are limited to one issue,.,patent
infringement.

That is, the only inquiry that may need to be

made is whether or not the accused Black Latch is a device
as defined by the claims of the licensed Brimhall Latch patent,
Tt Is Appropriate To Compel
The Exerc1se Uf Jur~sd~c-tlon
It is the law of the State of Utah that a district
court may be compelled to exercise jurisdiction when it has
erroneously declined or refused to take jurisdiction,

State

ex reL Rarnes v, ·sec·o·n·d District Court, et ·al, 36 Utah 296,
104 Pac, 282 (19091;· Han·soh

v.

Ive·rs·on, 61 Utah 172, 211 Pac,

682 (l!l22l; c.£,, Web·er v, SuperioY Court of Los Angeles
County,_-__ Cal,Zd _ _, 348 P,Zd 572 (_1960}; st-ate
Wasn._.

v.

Paul,

, 1114 P. 2d 745, 746 (19.4U},
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In the instant matter, the District Court has declined
to proceed on the grounds that it lacks jurisdiction"

However,

the District Court does have jurisdiction and should he compelled to proceed"

CONCLUSION
The defendants-appellants, Walker Bank and Davis,
are before this Court seeking an opportunity to present evidence
to the Trial Court and obtain a ruling such that Walker Bank
and Davis can obtain the benefit of the bargainooothe contractooo
imposed by the Trial Court's Amended Decree of July 30, 1975"
The Trial Court has erred in refusing to follow the
prior appeal decision of this Court, in refusing to enforce
its own judgment, and in "getting rid" of this case by finding
that jurisdiction is in the federal courtso

Such action on

the part of the Trial Court has, in fact, denied defendantsappellants Walker Bank and Davis due process of lawo

They

are being denied access to the very forum which granted the
rights they seek to enforce"
It would be an anomaly, if not a total hon ·s·equitur,
to force Walker Bank and Davis to proceed in federal court
to enforce contract rights awarded by a state courto

Of course,

Davis and Walker Bank have no legal jurisdictional or factual
basis to proceed in Federal Court.

Th.us, the Trial Court's

action, in effect and in fact, denies w:alker Bank and Davis
the opportunity to enforce the State Court Judgment and bring
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tQe issue of contempt to the attention of the Trial Court,
Sue~

a result should not ontain,
Walker Bank and Davis respectfully urge this Supreme

Court to reverse the Order of the Trial Court, dated October
24, 1978, and remand with a clear mandate and direction to
receive evidence on the issue of whether or not royalties are
due on the Black Latch, including the issue of contempt, but
not including the issue of patent validity,

Walker Bank and

Davis also respectfully reguest their costs in this Appeal.
DATED this ;J

JfA day

of August, 1979.

Respectfully submitted,
TRASK &
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS CAR0L BRIMHALL
DAVIS AND WALKE'<
this

BAN~as

;)/("day of

,

mailed, first class, postage prepaid,

~ V,

1979, as follows:

Two copies to Philip A. Mallinckrodt, Mallinckrodt

& ~allinckrodt,

10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111;

Two copies to A. Wally Sandack, Sandack

& Sandack,

370 East Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111;

nriginal and ten conies to the Clerk of the Suprefle
Court of the State of lltah.
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EARL P. STATIN

Suite 400, Chancellor Blug.
220 South Secona East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 531-7575
P!ULIP A. 1-'J\LLI:lCKRODr
10 Exchan~e Place
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111
Telephone: 328-1624
Attorr.~ys for Plaintiff and.
Third Party fufendant Brimco
Hyaraulics & Engineering, Inc.

Ll THE DISTRICI COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICI
IN AliD FOR SALT lAKE COUlffl, STAIE OF lJTAH

TDU: C0:1'!E?CL~L FDIA.'ICI:!G
CORPOR'\TION, a Utah ccrporation

Plaintiff,

vs.
CAROL BRI!%\l.1...; \·~AL(EP, 8:\l':K &
TRUST cc:~~Alfi I Au.rnil1istrator t.Jith
the !,.-Jill ann~:-:eo of the Estate
of Ray S. Brimhall, acceased,
ctal

Civil No, 1987 52

Defendants

bh \ 3'{ NO
't, - 5 - 15 ~

ond
EA:,"~

& TRUST COMP!\:iY,
.Aa:ninistra.tcl"l ~;ith the '.·iill

'tiALKER

3;Jl'1
.:;<.. \_\

At)

arr.c.x~.J

of t..'"'tc rs--cate of Ray
S, Eri:r..13.ll, aecca.sca 1
De.fcndant and

Thiru Party Plaintiff

vs.
BRTI~O ffiT?AULICS & EJ~GDmiNG,
INC., a COI"?Oration, et al

Thiro Party Defendants

The issues of ownership or other proprietary interest of plaintiff in Vnitea States Lette-""'5 Patent ifo. 3 1 430,653 and United States

Application for Letters Patent Serial :1o. 732 1 484 came on re0Ularly for
trial before the Court,

~-Tithout

a jury, cor.r.'.encino; Jar.uar: 10, 1972, all
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OF _ _..:j:.c...---

issues respecting liabil~ty ana d.a:na.~?,cs having been res~ea by the Court
for trial at a future uate; Wrl p. Staten, Craig G, Adamson a'ld. Philip A.
Mallinckrod.t, appea..'""Ca as COUI"'scl for plaintiff and tlli...~ party uefer.dant

Briroco Hydraulics & Eneincering, Inc.; Earl D. Tar~, appe.arccj for aefcndants

earor

&imhall; '.-la.lkcr Bank & Trust Ccmpany, as t'dm:ir.istrator with ':he

Will annexed of the Estate of P-av S, &imhall, aeceaseo; Stephen D, Schultz
and Brimhall Products, Inc. ; Clark 1-1. Sessions

~present~

.•!lllidr.l Hesterman

1

and 4-Spectra, Inc.; defcnaan't John s. Fai.rloar.ks, Jr. aid not: appear bccausc

of a pleaaing filca hcrcin whereby he assignee! to plaintiff any interest he

may have had in saia letters Patent: and Patent Application.
having been pre.serrteo t e'Jia.er:.ce havir.g been tal(en t ar.a.

The matter

arzunent

hav~

been

errtc....~

sul:mitted to the Cotrt ana consioe.."r"ea, the Court having ;r.aoe ana

its Fina.ir.gs of Fact and Conclusions of Law hCI"'ein, ana the Court bcir.g
fully a.avised in the prenises, nO"...r, therefore;

IT IS HERESY ORDE'<ED, ADJ\J!X;ED AliD DECPJ:m:
L

That the aefcndant 1•.Jal.kar B3nk & Trust Company, as the au2. v

app:)inted Administrator with \.Jill Annc.xed of the Estate of

?-a~:

S. 3ri.-::r.a22,

deceased, is t!-te crwner of the legal and equitable title of '...T-.it:~
letters Patent: No. 3,430,653, anti the invention acscribea

~":'3:t2~

t:~~ir. c.··rt.:..t_~a.

"Hyaraulics Valve ana Systan" 1 which r..etters Patcmt' vas issued !1arch 4th,
Said patent was and is subject

1969, for a tern of seventeen (17) years.

to a royalty

:ree,

in the ac.fer.d.ant,

persor-.a.l, non-assigr.able lim.i:tca license
1.~cst~

~cscarch

anc.J.

~~ufacturing

defined in t..":e settle:ncnt as;recrr.cnt aa.tea

!'-~.arch

outsta.Y').din~

Company, rrorc fully

14, 1969, ar.d of record

in Civil .Action IIo. 178247 in this Court.

2.

That the

/l..a!ninistrator

d~f enaant l.~alker

Bar..~( & '!'rust Company, as the said

•..rith ',•/ill Anncxeo of the Estate of Ray s. Erin."lall, deceased,

is thc 01-mcr of 1:hc legal ana equitable title in ar.d to Uni1:cd S1:atcs

Patent Application Serial tJo. 732 1 484 and the ir.vcnt:ion ocscribca therein
cntit:lC<J "Hydraulics

Syst~

ana

~ec~ical

L3.t:ch

'I'r.~for,"

and letters

J:d'tcnt 3, 797,392 grar.tec.J unacr said patent application by the Unite:! Stat:es
Patcrrt Office on 11arch 19, 1972,
3.

7hat the plaintiff ;:'i';tC CcrT.:crcial Fi.nar-.ci.ng Corporation is

the a..mcr of an i:r:plica

cxclusiv~

license un.uer said :..:ni tea St:atcs Letters
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OF

I.

l.

=

Patent No. 3,4-30,653 (th2: "Valve System11 invention) and unaer United States

Patent Application No, 7 32,484 (the "Cab Latch" invoontionl and any letters
patent granted thereon, said license baing the exclusive right to make, usc,

and sell saia inventions and the rir)1t to pledge, rrortgage and assip;n said
license, for purposes of security, for the lives of any letters patent granta:! thereon.

In return for saia license, plaintiff Tine CDmncrcial Financing

Corporation is obligated to pay r.onthly to 'dalker &ink & Trust Company, as
duly appointe:! Administrator with \iill Annexea of the Estate of Ray S.

Brimhall, deceased, and its successors and assigns, royalties in the arrount of
two percent ( 2%) of total sales of Valve Syste:ns ana Cab Latches and parts

thereof,

The payment of said royalties is a condition of said license. To

assure the accuracy of the calculation and accounting for royalties, recora.s
of plaintiff, Time Comrcrcial Financ:ir.g Corporation, as r.a.y be necessary to

an accounting verification of the arrounts of total sales, subject to license,
shall be made available at reasonable int,;rvals, but not rrore than quarterly,
for examination by an independent Certifiec.l Public Accountant to be selected
by the owner of the "Valve System Paterrt 11 and "Cab I..a.tc..'h, Patent."

4. That plainti£f Tirre CCI!mercial Financing Corporation has made
payments, or tcnaere<i payments to '.-lalker &ink & Trust Company, as Administrator with '.·lill annexed of the Estate of Ray S, Brimhall, decease:!, of
all royalties accrue:! up to and incluaing March 31, 1972, except royalties

in the sum of $4,844.79 that plaintiff, in good faith, believed had been
duly tendered,

That Tine Comr.crcial Financ:ir.g Corporation has tendered said

sum of $4,844,79 to ''lalkcr &ink & Trust Company, as A<lministrator with •,.Jill
Annexea of the Estate of Ray
1975,

s.

Brimhall, <.lcceascd, on the 12th aa.y of June,

Neither the sufficiency nor toe timeliness of any amount tenaer<ec

since f'.arch 31,1972 has been adjudicatea herein.
5.

All issues respecting liability for' damages, in::luding defenses

to plaintiff's claim for darnajjcS and counterclaims, and all issues as to the
arrotmt of d.a.mages to be awarded ~ithcr party arc res~Y'Vca for furtt-.er proceeo-

.i.ngs herein.
'
Da"ted this

:::5/''-/:t

~my

of July, 1975,

/

/~
I
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OF _ ___c.._ _

Served the foregoir.g N!len<ied lleCI'Oe on Earl !l, Tanner of

Tannru-, Gala & Trask, attorneys for d'!fendants ana third party ?lain-

tiff,. 345 South State Sn-.et, Salt Lake City Utah, postage prepaid
this

jj__ day

of July, 1975,
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[5] The record makes clear that
appellant was hired bv the corporation to
produce a menu book, a task for which she
was to receive one-thtrd of the profits. The
corporation absorbed all expenses in
producing the book, and the defendant
Geldcrman was the motivatln'! force behmd
the project. Appellant did not- originate the
project and had no control over the corporation or its shareholders. Under these circumstances, appellant has failed to over~
come the presumption that the mutual intent or the parties is that the title to the
copyright shall be in the employer. Accordingly, the judgment of the district coun is
affirmed.
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PATENTS
1. Infringement- In general (§39.01)

Jurisdiction of courts- Contracts and
patent title (§43.15)
Jurisdiction of courts fringement ( §43.45)

Patent in-

There is no exclusive federal junsdiction
over "questions" aris1ng under patent laws
and onlv "cases" so arJsJng mav be brought
in federal courts; suH ansf:s under law that
creates cause of action, and whde suH for Infringement of patent anses under patent
laws and is therefore cogmzable under 28
U.S.C. J338(a), suit to eriforce undenak1ne:
to pay royalties for use of patent anses un~
der stare law and JS not w!thmJunsdJctlon of
federal courts; licensor whose licensee
breaks agreement 1s entitled to declare
license for-felted for breach of condinon subsequent and sue for Infringement and. if it JS
correct as to 1ts nghr to declare forfeiture
unilaterally, wh1ch IS stare law questton,
federal jurisdiction of mfnngemenr sun e:o:ists; even al\e~atLon <d 1nfnngement. bv
licensor who stands on license a~reement
and seeks contr.:tct remedies wdl not create
fedcraljunsdLctJon, since existence of IH.ense
bars possibility of infnngement.

2. Jurisdiction of courts -

Patent in-

fringement ( §43.45)
State courts -

Pleading and practice

( §63.5)
Defense of patent 1nvalidirv can be
asserted in state court. wh1ch properlv has
junsdicnon of revalues sun, 2H L' S.C.
1338(a) makes federal JUrLsdictlon of cases
ansm.g under patent laws exclus1ve.

3. Jurisdiction of courts - Declaratory
jud~ment Actual controversy
( §43.303)
L1censee's alle15ation that licensor is standing
on
license
agreement
lorecloses
possibility that licensee fears 1ts nonpavment of royalties v. ill result m licensor
declaring forfeiture and suin~ for ~nfnn~e
ment and renders Oeclaratorv Judgment
Act suit unavailable to licensee.

4. Jurisdiction of courts - Declaratory
judgment - In general (§43.301)
Jurisdiction of courts - Declaratorv
judgment Actual controversY

(§43.303)
Patent licensee's declaratorv complaint
that asserts patent invaiJditv to avo1d
obligations of license, absent d1versuv, does
not state claim ansing under patent lav.-s

within meamng of 28

C S.C.

1338!a I;

Edward Katzmger Co. v. Ch1cago :\.1etallic

.\Janufactunng Co .. 72 CSPQ 18. does not
embody 1mphcH hold1ng that licensee can
invoke federal junsdict1on to test federal
validity defense; declararorv JUdg_-ment
plamuff's stake_ must be mterest In avmding
mfnn~emem ILt!?atton to satJsfv JunsdJC·
tlOn.Jl requ1rement that case anse under patent la\'.. s.
.\ppeal from Distnct Court for Eastern
Dist:-Jct of \Visconstn, Revnolds, J.
.\cnon bv .\filpnnt. Inc, a~?atnst
Cur\..-ood. Inc. for declaratorv JUdgment of
patent mvaJJdLtV and breach oi l!cense
a12:reemenrs From order dismLsSLng com·
pL:unt. plamt1ff appeals. r\ifirmed.

Donald G. Casser.
appellant.
DenniS

\(.

Pnstc!sk1.
appellee.
Before

Pel!.

~Iii waukee,

Wis , for

\lc\\'iliiams and James S
both

of

Tone.

Ch1cago.

and

\Vood.

Ill .

for

Circuit

Judges
Pell, Circuit Judge.
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Appellee Curwood, Inc., is the owner of a
patent co\'enng a plastic lamtnated film
product
In 1970. Cun\ood advised

appe-llant :..Iilpnnt, Inc, that

should

H

either take a license under the patent or
prepare for an infnn~ement suit. P.y two

agreements in April 1971

~Iilprint

took a

license but reserved 1ts right to contest the
validuy of the patent In m1d~ 1973, .\lilprint
ceased making royalty pa\·ments due under
the license agreement and on .\larch I.
1976, Curwood instituted an actJon for
royalties in the Circuit Court of :..filwaukee
Counrv, \\'Jsconsin. Diversny between the
panie; being lack1ng. the srat·e court, as \•oill
be discussed heremafter, was the onlv forum

available to Curwood.

·

On :'\.larch 22, 1976, :-.lilprint filed in the
district court a comp!amt seeking a
declaratory judgment to the effect that
Curwood's rhen current reissue patent and
its predecessor were invalid. that no further
royalties were due Curwood under the
license agreements, and that ~lilpri!lt was
entitled to return of the royaltieS paid
between 1971 and 1973. A separate count of
the complaint alleged breaches of the
agreements by Curwood and sought similar
declarations as to revalues. On April I,
~1ilprint filed a petition removin~ the state
court case w the district court. The district
court remanded the case because it had
been "removed improvidently and without
jurisdiction." 28 U.S C. §1447(c).' In the
same decisJOn and order, the district court
rejected Curwood 's argument that the case
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
but nonetheless dismissed the dec!ararorv
action because of the pendency of the state
coun suit.
4

~lilprint's appeal attacks only the
propriety of the district coun 's discretionary
dismissal, an.d Curwood, apparently
satisfied \\:tth a dismissal on any ground, has
not pressed tts JUnsdJctJOnal objection in
this coun. The objection made in the dis·
trict coun was that :..lilpnnt 's declaratory
act10n does not "ans(e) under any Act of
Congress relating to patents" wHhm the

1
By unr~port~d order of F'~bruarv 11. 1977,
this court dtsmtssed :--.ltlpnm ·s appeal from this
remand order for lack of appeli.1te Junsd!Ctton
Curwood. lnc v :--.fdpnnL Inc., :\o /7.JOSO See
28 L:.S.C § 1447(d), Thermtron Products. Inc. v
Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343 (1976).

196 USPQ

meaning of 28 U.S C §!338(a)' The distncr coun was of the view that the action
"manifestlr does" so arise. Because the
mau er does n01 seem to us to be so simple,
we must first decide whether the district
court had junsdiction of the case. See Arvin
l~dusrries. Inc \'. Berns Air Kin~ Corpora·
t1on, 510 F.2d 1070, 1072, 185 lJSPQ 7, 8
(7th Cir. 1975).

f1 J It has long' been clear, not withstand·
ing 1he substantial federal interest in pat·
cnt matters. that there 1s no exclusive
federal jurisdiction O\er qurrtwns arising un·
der the paten.t lav.·s. only casu so arising may
be brought m the federal couns. Pratt v.
Pans Gas Li~ht & Coke C.ompany, 168 U.S.
255, 259 (1897) Consistent "ith the oftcited principle stated by Justice Holmes in
American \\'ell Works Co. v Layne &
Bowler Co, 241 L:S. 257, 260 (1916) (in
which patent jurisdiction was asserted), that
"[a] suit anses under the law that creates
the cause of action," it is well established
that
["":]hile a suit for infringement of a patent
anses under the patent laws and is
therefore cognizable under 28 V S.C.
§ 1338(a), a suit ro enforce an undenaking
to. pay royalr 1es for the use of a patent
anses under state law and 1s not within
rhe jurisdiction of tne federal couns.
Albright v Teas, 106 l' S 613
(1883\ Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 lJ.S.

496, SJO.

(1926).

Arvin Industries, supra, 510 F.2d at
1072-73. 185 L:SPQ at 7-9' ..\.patent licensor \vhose licensee has broken the agreement
is not Without ch01ce between a state and a
federal forum. It can. for example, declare
the license forfeited for breach of a condition
subsequent and sue for infrin~emem. If it is

1

Section 1338(a) provides:
The district couMs shall have original
junsdiwon of anv civd action ansing under any
.l.ct of Congress re!aun~ to pat ems, plant vane·
tr protect JOn, copvn~h!S and trademarks. Such
JUrisdicuon shall be exclusi,·e of the courts of
the states m patent, plant variety protection
and cop)'flght cases.
) Under these principles, there can be no doubt
that the count of ~[dprinr's compL:11nt which
alle~es Curwood's breaches of the license agreement and seeks. thus. a declaration that ~Iilprint
JS entitled to return of alre~dy paid royahies. ha!
no JUnsdtcuonal s1~mficance. This count sounds
exclus1veh· 1n contract, and, unlike the other
coum, dot-s not even assen the existence of patent
law 1ssues.
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correct as to its right to declare such a
forfeiture unilaterally (a question of state
law) federal jurisdiction of the infrin15cmem
suit exists. Luckett v De!park, Inc., supra,
270 U.S. at Stl. But where the licensor
stands on the license agreemenr and seeks
conttact remedies, even an allegation of infringement will no~ create fedel-ai JUnsdJC·
tion, for the existence of the license
precludes the possibility of infnngement.
Arvin lndusrnes, supra, 510 F.2d at 1073,
185 USPQ at 8-9.
[2) These principles lead straight to the
conclusion that Curwood's state court
royalties suit, diversity be1ng absent. could
have been brought nowhere else but m a

state coun. Curwood's suit 1s a prototypal
one of a cause that arises under state. not
federal patenr, law • .\1J!prmr's assert tons
that the underlying patents are invalid could
be asserted by way of defense m the stare
court. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 39j t.:.S.
653, 669-71, 676, 162 t.:SPQ I, 7-8, 10
(1969).

The questions at hand are whether
Milprim's action does anything more rhan
seek to establish what would be its defenses
in the state court revalues action, and. if
not, whether the DeciJ.ratory Judgment .-\ct.
28 U.S. C. §2201, somehow allo"s ~lilprim
to test a defense in federal court that could,
without the Act, only be raised 10 state
court.

[3) We answer the first question in the
negative. As we have remarked. the second
count of the complaint, which asserts
something akin to a traditional rescission
cause of act1on, must be disregarded for
jurisdictional purposes. See n.3 s'upra The
balance of the compiamt, while 1t (lssens the
invalidity of Curnood's patents. Js entlrelv
geared to the rovaltv dispute. The exiSience
of the license agreements. and a l?enerahzed
statement of their terms, are alleged, but 1t
is nowhere stated that the license has been
terminated by en her panv. In fact, the com·
plaint specifically avers the ex1stence of
Curwood's pending state court sun to en-

4
It should be r~a!led here rhar 28 L' ~ ,-.
§t338(a) makes federal Junsdtctton of c.1ses .msing under the patenr la...,s rulur~:·r Absf'nt dnerslly, the propriety of a state forum set" e e- Lear.
supra, necessanlv tmphes the noncXJ.Stf'nce of
f~deral jurisdtctton. See C.h1sum. The .\lloc;HLon
ofjurisdiwon bet ....·een .Statf' and Ff'derJI Courts
in Pat~nl LJtJgaJtOn, 46 \\'ash. L. Rev 6JJ, 670

(1970).
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force

payment of rovalt1es. The reltd
sou~ht, other than a declarauon of rarenr
1nvaiJdHy and of the nghts of the parttes un·
der the license a~ree-menr. ts spectfica!ly
atmed at elimmatJng \fdpnnr ·s rova,ty
obliG;attons Th1s 1s. thus. a qune du.inent
case than would be presenred bv a complaint al!e~tng that a licensee's nonpayment
of royalties 'Save u reason to fear the bcensor
would declare a forfeiture and sue for tn·
fnngement By a!legtng that Curwood ts
standmg on the license a~reement. :'-.1dpnnt
forecloses that poss1bility See Arvm In·
dustries, supra, jiO F.2d at 1073, 185
L'SPQ at 8-9. Thiokol Chemical Corporotion v. Burlington Industnes. Inc 448 F 2d
1328, 13JOn.2, 171 LSPQ193, 194DdCir
19'1). cert demed. 404 L' S 1019. 172
L'SPQ 257 (1972) In fact. the v.ord "infnngement" does not even appear 10 the
complamt For purposes of JUnsdictton.
then. this case is nothtng more than
.\1ilpnnt 's attempt to use th-e Dec!aratorv
Judgment Act to estab!tsh a federal defense
to an acuon grounded exclus1velv 10 state
law, which could onlv be and has been
brought in state court.
\Ve belie\e the attempt must faiL The Act
provides. 28 t.: S C. §2201, that" [l)n a case
of actual controversv Wilhtn 1ts IUrtsdictwn
any court of the Cnited sCares
may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested panv seekmg
such declaration
" (Emphasts
supplied.) By its terms, the Act makes
declaratory judgment JUnsd!Ct!On depen·
dent on the traditional ~rants of J unsdicuon
by which conventional coerc1ve suus would
be Judged.
"[T)he

operation

of the

DeclaratorY

Jud~ment :\.ct 1s procedural onlv ·· .-\emJ

Life Ins. Co. v Hawonh. 300 l' S 227
240 [193") Congress enlareed the ranee
of remedtes avatbble 10 the federal courts
but did nor extend the1r JUf!SdJctlon.
Skelly Od Co. v. Phd lips Petroleum Co., 339
L'.S. 667. 671 (19jO)
In Skelly Oil, the declaratorv plamufT
sought to ha\·e its nght to contract performance adjudicated The defendants hJd
stated thev \\Ould not pen"orm because the
contract "as condtnoned on the tssuance 0!
a Fedrrrtl Po,\er Comm1ssJon centt'icate of
pub tic com emence and necess!lv to p1a1n·
t1ff. whtch h.1d. ll \\.15 <;a!d not been 1ssued
10 ttme The comola1nt alleged that the ccrtlftcate had bCen "1ssue-d" tn ttme
~otwuhstand1ng that the ume of tssuance of
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the certificate was a federal law question
critical 10 plainrifrs recovery, and that the

dispute thereon had to be pleaded to establish a ln·e controversy. the Supreme
Coun held there was no federal jurisdiction,
in accordance wnh the long-established rule
that the pla1ntifrs cla1m must present a
federal question without reference to anticipated defenses. Id. at 672; see Louisville
and i\'ashnlle Railroad Company v.
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) The Coun
stated:
To sanction suits for declaratory relief as
within the jurisdiction of the District
Courts merely because, as in this case,
artful pleading anticipates a defense based on federal lav..· would contravene the
whole trend of JUrisdictJOnallegislaoon by
Congress, disregard the effecti\'e func·
tioning of the federal judicial system and
distort the limited procedural purpose of
the Declaratory Judgment Act See
Developments in the Law- Declaratory
Judgments - 1941-1949, 62 Harv. L.
Rev. 787, 802-03 (1949).
339 U.S. at 673-74.
Here, unlike Skelly Oil, the federal
"defense" is asserted as the claim of the
declaratory plaintiff. Procedurally, of
course, this IS pan of what the Declarator.•
Judgment Act IS all about, but we think the
jurisdictional prtnciples should be the same.
The Skelly Court apparently agreed. The
very portion of the Harvard Law Re\'lew
Comment cited approvingly by the Coun
reached the conclusion that a declaratory
action seeking to test a defense should be
triable in the federal courts only if it would
normally arise m ansv..·er to a complamt
which itself would properly raise a federal
question. CHing the same Comment. the
Court in Public Service Commission of L"tah
v. \VvcoiT Companv. Inc., 344 C.S. 237, 248
(19;2), observed that "[w[here the complaint in an action for declaratory judgment
seeks in essence to assert a defense to an 1m·
pending or threatened state court actto~. it
is the character of the threatened action,
and not of rhe defense. wh1ch will determine
whether there is_ federal-~uesuon jurisdic·
tion in the Distnct Court. •
[4) In our opinton the logic of Skellv Oil
and \\'vcoff controls this case. his true. that
the De'clarawry Judgment Act does allow
cases to be brought 1n federal courts whtch
would not, for lcu:k of a proprr c~rcu..•t rtmtdy,
otherwise be there. But It would be
anomalous to conclude that an Act wh1ch
provides only fnoadu.ral and rrmtdtallleXJbili·

196 USPQ

ty somehow allows a party to invoke federal
question JUnsdiction to adjudicate its
federal defense to an exdusn·ely state law
action. Accordmglv. we hold that where
ci1versity ts lacking, a patent licensee's
declaratory complamt wh1ch asserts patent
in\'alidity simply to avoid the oblig;:uions of
the license does not state a claim arising un·
der the patent laws withm the meaning of28
L: S.C. §1338(a).' The Third Circuit has
flatly so held, Thiokol Chemical CorporatiOn, supra, 448 F.2d 1328, 171 l!SPQ 193,
and the Tenth Circuit in Product Engineer~
ing and :....tanufacturing_ Inc v. Barnes, 424
F.2d 42, 16; L:SPQ 229 (lOth Cir. 1970),
while considering the jurisdictional issue in
conjunction with a discretionary dismissal
issue much as is presented here, with some
resulting loss in conceptual clarity, did ex·
pressly afrirm the district court's conclusion
that an action virtually identical to this one
"was purely a contract action which proper·
ly should be litigated in the State coun." !d.
at 43, 16; L:SPQ at 229.'
I Because
the importance or respecting
jurisdictional limits often leads federal couns to
cxammc their JUnsdJctJOn even where the part1es
do not quest1on it, 11 m:ght be argued that
Edward Katzin~er Co v. Chicago .\.letallic
~lanuiacrunng Co .. 329 L! S 394, 72 CSPQ tB
(1947), embodu~s an impliCit hold1ng that a
licensee can mvoke federal JUnsdiction to r~ a
federal vahdm- defense. We thmk u doe's not. for
three reasons.' First, the declararorv platntdT ,n
Karzm~er had n01 only ceased rovaitv ').Jvments
but had also termmated the license and sou~hr
declarauon not only of inval1diry but also or nOninfringement. Second, even tf this were not so, we
doubt- that anv such implicit and unconsidered
"hold1ng" surnved Ske!ly Od and Wycoff. Third,
diversny junsdicoon may. for all that appears,
ha\·e ex1sted in Katzm~?er The existence of diver·
suy JUfiSOJctlon, wh1ch is shown by court records
but not mentioned 10 the opimons, explains this
court's unquest10n1nt?' acceptance of junsdiction
tn two recent declara10rv actions bv licensees,
US.\. I Coroorauon \' S!andard Pressed Steel Co.,
524 F 2d 1.097, 188 CSPQ 52 17th Cir. 1975); Jnd
Beckman Instruments. Inc. v Techn1cal Develop·
mem Corporatton. 433 F 2d 55. 167 L.'SPQ 10
(7th Ctr. 1970), ce".demed, 401 u.S. 976, 169
CSPQ 65 (1971)
• Indeed, thu court has recently indicated the
result ,.,e reach today. In Super Products Cor·
poration v D P Way Corporatton, 546 F.ld 748,
753 n.S. 192 CSPQ 417.420-421 (7th Cir. 1976),
a case pnmarily concerned w1th the existence of a
real case or comrO\'ersy, it was obsen>ed, citing
Tluokol. supra, that
[t]he plamtiff's stake must be an interest in
av 01 dtn!O!; 1njnngrmtnJ /Jt1gat1on or rhe threat of
such lltla:at10n to sausfy the. . jurisdictionaJ
requlfe~ent that the case arise under the pat·
ent Jaw jEmphas1s supplied.j
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We have considered and found without
merit other issues raised by ~filprint in·
eluding the contentions that it is an Jmposltion on a state judicial system to require its
judges to resolve complex issues under
federal patent statutes With wh1ch thev are
generally unfamiliar and that there are
potential discovery limitations at the state
forum level. Aside from the fact that Y\t are
cognizant of frequent federal judicial
recognition of the concurrent ability of state
courts to handle difficult le~Sal questions in·
eluding federal constitutional ones. we are
unaware of any basis in con ten nons such as
those presently urged for according- JUnsdiction to a court when that jurisdiction does
not otherwise exist.
Although our reasons differ from those
used by the distrtct coun, we conclude that
the judgment of dismissal must be, and u
hereby is, affirmed.

Decided Dec. 8, 1977

TRADEMARKS
1. In general (§67.01)
Company name that serves to identify
applicant is without sJgmficance for establishing trademark.

2. Acquisition of marks- Character and
extent of usc [n general
(§67.0731)
Slogan that does not identify and distinguish applicant's goods from those
manufactured or sold bv others, but rather
serves to distinguish aPplicam from other
companies having similar name IS not
registrable as trademark.
Appeal from Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board,
193 USPQ 122.
Application for re~istra{lon of tr;tdemark
of Baker lndustnes.lnc, Senal :\o •21.1•1
From decisiOn refuSJn'! regtstrallon. applicant appeals. Affirmed, Lane, Jud~e, concurring in result.
Albert L. Ely, Jr, and F:Iv & Golrick. both
of Cleveland, Ohio, for appellant.

Joseph F. Nakamura !Fred W Sherlin~. of
counsel) for CommissiOner of Patents and
Trademarks.
Before ~[arkev, Chief Judge, and Rich,
Baldwm, Lane, and .\ld!er, Associate
Judges.
Baldwm, Judge.
This is an appeal from the decision of the
Trademark Tnal and Appeal Board (TT,\B), 193 LSPQ 122 (1976). demmg
reg-istratiOn on the Pnnc1pa! Re'2JSter ol the
wOrds "The Prmccttve Ser.1ce ·comoanv"
in applicanon senal ~o J2 i .1.+1 filed Apr! I
12, !972, for decrncal and/or eiecrronJc
sensing, transmittmg:, and alarm m;nal
dev1ces. The TTAB based Its decJsJon on the
ground that the words neither 1dentl!v the
source of the goods nor dJstm~uJsh the
goods from other such goods 1n accordance
with the definHwn of ''trade-mark" set forth
in section 45 of the Lanham .-\ct
(Trademark Act of 1946).' \Ve affirm.
During the prosecution, appc!l~nt
presented spccJmens. postal meter madmg
tapes, which showed the actual use of the
words in commerce The mailing tapes are
affixed to packages m wh1ch appellant ·s
goods are mailed. The words. wh1ch
appellant argues are m the nature of a
slogan, are used on the packages m conJunction with appellant's trade name. Baker Indusrries. Appellant further argues that the
slo~an distinguishes the goods 10 accordance with reqUirements of secuon 4S.

Opinion
In their briefs before the court. both parties cited In re \\'alker Process Eou10ment
Inc., 43 CCPA 913. 233 F 2d 329. 110
LSPQ 41 (1956) (hereinafter cued as
\Valker). \\"a!ker tnvolved an attempt to
regrster ··\Valker Process Equ1pment Inc.··
as a trademark The facts show that :IllS
phrase was used m conJuncnon ..., 1th ·· P:-oquip," a registered trademark Re~ardm~?
the issue of whether the company n.Jme
served also as a tradcm<~.rk to tdenuh and to
distinguish appclbnt ·s goods. the court concluded that the companv name \\.lS not so
used. A sJe:ntficant fact \\htch supported the
conc!us1or1 \\as placement oi appellant ·s .10d.ress \\Jth the comoanv name Thl" tncluston of the addres~ more fully 1dentdied

' 15 uSC 1127.

_;g;;__.
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